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I. INTRODUCTION
{1} With the explosion of the information age, the subject of many transactions has become what is
known as "digital property." W1] The most obvious property of this sort is purchased every day in the
form of software. However, unlike many forms of property, software is generally not sold; it is licensed.
[2Q Also, as a result of the internet and the information age, the parties to a transaction may not even be
from the same country. Software companies responding to the unique needs of the software developer
attempting to protect his/her intellectual property rights have began to use a mass-market license
attached to the front of the box in which the software is purchased. This license is generally referred to
as a "shrink-wrap" license. [3] These licenses contain terms which basically limit the uses to which a
purchaser can put the software. 41 As contract law normally requires mutual assent for a contract to be
binding, the terms of the "shrink-wrap" license state that the opening of the cellophane wrapping on the
boxed software will act as an act of assent, thus binding the purchaser of the software to the terms of the
license. [5] In short, the purchaser of the software has a take-it-or-leave-it contract where the simple act
of opening the box binds them to the terms of the license. This is by definition, an adhesive contract. [6
(2} These contracts, which arise in the absence of arms-length dealing between two equally powerful

parties are not unknown in American law. Contracts of adhesion have been prevalent in American life
for many years. Every time someone takes their clothes to the cleaners, they enter into an adhesive
contract. Generally speaking, adhesion by itself, is not a sufficient basis for voiding the terms of the
contract. 71 However, the issue becomes more problematic when the contract is between parties which
are of different nationalities, and when the terms of the contract include an arbitration clause.
13) To make the problem associated with arbitration clauses clearer, let's examine the following
hypothetical: a Finnish software development company sells its new encryption package to an office
manager of a small American on-line publishing firm. This American company has bought one copy of
the software, and enclosed in the terms of the software license is an arbitration clause stating the situs of
the arbitration will be in Helsinki, and the administers of the arbitration will be the International
Chamber of Commerce (ICC.) The license also contains the provision that the software may only be run
on one computer unless additional licenses are purchased for the other computers on which the copies
will be run. The American company grows quickly and adds to its publication staff one-hundred and
fifty more people. As the software is one of the best on the market, the American company wishes to
continue using the application. However, the licenses for commercial use of the software are several
hundred dollars per license. The American company erroneously decides that they have purchased the
software (when in fact they have only licensed it), consequently, they decide that they can use it
throughout their operations. The American company proceeds to install the program on all one hundred
and fifty new machines and goes on about its business. The Finnish software company learns about the
misuse of its software, checks its records and sees that the American company has only one license for
one computer. Consequently, the Finnish company files a complaint with the ICC for arbitration of the
breach of the terms of the license.
I4) The American company now has a problem. It is being compelled to arbitrate in Helsinki, under ICC
rules. Needless to say, the American company does not want to go through arbitration in Finland. Now
the Finnish software company goes to an American court to compel the American company to arbitrate.
What are the problems the Finnish company will encounter? Better yet, what are the problems the
American company will encounter? This paper will attempt to lay out the issues which will arise in the
Finnish company's bid to enforce the arbitration clause embedded in the "shrink-wrap" licenses. Part II
will give a basic background in arbitrability and what defines arbitrability. Part III of this paper will
address the traditional view of arbitration taken by American courts in light of the Federal Arbitration
Act. Part IV will address the international treaties which deal with arbitration and how the presumption
of enforceability has seemed to arise under these international treaties. Part V will address the
underlying issues of adhesion and public policy to determine if adhesion is even an issue which needs to
be dealt with. Finally, Part VI will conclude in determining when adhesive arbitration clauses will be
enforced in international transactions.

II. ARBITRABILITY
{5) Before one can ask if arbitration is enforceable, one must first determine what arbitration is and
what arbitration can be applied to. Arbitration, at its most basic, is a binding, non-Article IMI resolution
of a dispute between parties. Because of the confidentiality concerns [8J and the court's limited review
of arbitration decisions, some causes of action have been determined to be improper for arbitration
because of public policy concerns. M9]
(6) So what can be arbitrated? This question can most easily be answered by looking at the controlling
statutes. In the United States, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) [101 is the controlling law. Like most
arbitration laws, the FAA requires the agreement to arbitrate to be in writing. D11 The New York and

Panama [12J Conventions on the enforcement of foreign arbitration awards also require an agreement to
arbitrate to be in writing. [131 While these statutes and treaties do differ in what constitutes a writing, all
require some memorial of the agreement which can be shown to a court where enforcement is wished.
[141 Unfortunately, the treaties and statutes do not discuss what goes into making a binding arbitration
agreement. [15] Apparently, one can simply insert a clause stating that all disputes arising from this
contract will be resolved by arbitration and that such a clause will be deemed to be a binding arbitration
clause. [16]
{7} How does one determine the scope of an arbitration clause? Hopefully, the drafter of the clause will
have included items like situs, choice of substantive contract law, administrating body (or if the
arbitration is ad hoc, the method of choosing the arbitrator(s) and the procedural rules which will control
the arbitration), and realm of issues to be covered under the arbitration clause. [171 However, if any of
these items are not included in the arbitration agreement, the existing treaties do have some default
provisions. The Panama Convention has default provisions for administered arbitration using the
Inter-American Council of Commercial Arbitration. [181 Unfortunately, the FAA and New York
Conventions do not have similar default provisions. The absence of these default positions, therefore
may require court action by the party wishing to enforce arbitration. J91 However, what is clear, is that
where there exists a recognized writing, memorializing an arbitration agreement, an arbitration
agreement will be legally recognized under statute.

III. LEGAL STANDING OF ARBITRATION - AMERICAN LAW
{8) Now that we know the answer to arbitrability, the next question is: how do the courts enforce the
recognized agreements? Initially, the American judiciary was not very hostile toward enforcing
arbitration agreements of any kind. The courts felt that an arbitration agreement was restricting a party's
right to relief from the courts. [20] Such relief, it was felt, was a constitutional right which could not be
waived. [1]3 Consequently, many courts did not uphold arbitration agreements under the guise that they
were thought to be against public policy. [221 Responding to judicial resistance to arbitration, the federal
government enacted the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). [231 Since the enactment of the FAA, the
Supreme Court has developed an interpretation of this statute which all but requires any type of
arbitration clause to be upheld. [241 Prior to the enactment of the FAA, the courts were reluctant to
demand the parties engage in arbitration. In Almacenes Fernandez,S.A. v. Golodetz, [251 the Second
Circuit held that an institution of a lawsuit in the courts could act as a waiver of a party's right to
arbitrate. [261 The Circuit's decision in Golodetz seems to point out that arbitration is simply another
mechanism in contract formation. Arbitration's importance in this case seems to be somewhat less than
what the Supreme Court's later position on arbitration became. [271 Even after the implementation of
the FAA, the federal courts still held that the right to arbitration could be waived if a judicial remedy
were sought by a party. The Seventh Circuit found in Bank of Madison v. Graber,[281 similar waiver
concepts that later ignored in Sky Reefer. [29] Consequently, the position of per se enforcement of
arbitration clauses did not appear until much later. Even after the enactment of the FAA, the Supreme
Court still found the States could exercise discretion in determining under what circumstances
arbitration would be allowed. [301
19) The greatest movement toward the per se rule of arbitration clause enforcement was Prima Paintv.
Flood & Conklin Mfg.. [311 In PrimaPaint,the Supreme Court developed the doctrine of separability,
which increased the likelihood of enforcement of an arbitration clauses. This doctrine operates to
separate the arbitration clause from the actual contract when the underlying contract is held to be void
due to fraud, duress, or other legal or equitable grounds. [32 As a result of Prima Paint,an arbitration
clause in a contract had to be attacked as a separate agreement. Merely voiding the underlying contract

did not also cause the arbitration clause to be considered void as well. [33] The arbitration clause would
only be considered void if there was fraud in the inducement, or other such grounds at law or equity,
which would serve to void the arbitrationclause not the underlying contract. [341 Requiring the
plaintiff to, in effect, attack two separate agreements greatly undermined the ability to avoid the
arbitration agreement as evidence about the intent of the defendant, while present regarding the
underlying contract, would be scarce regarding the arbitration agreement. Even though Prima Paint
entrenched the validity of arbitration clauses, arbitration still did not hold the favored position that it has
today. The States could still require certain causes of action to be heard before the judiciary. In fact, the
federal courts required many classes of statutory actions to be heard by an Article In tribunal. [35
{1} It was not until the early 1980's, that the Supreme Court began to develop a federal common law
regarding arbitration which, operates as an almost per se rule for the enforcement of arbitration clauses.
In 1983, the Supreme Court directly stated that where there are doubts as to the scope of the arbitration
clause, those doubts should be resolved in favor of arbitration. [361 Later, in Southland Corp. v.
Keating, [37 the Supreme Court overturned a California statute requiring the judicial consideration of
franchise agreements. [381 The California Supreme Court had upheld the California Franchise
Investment Law, which required that the judiciary review all complaints arising out of franchise
agreements. [391 The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed with the Supreme Court of California's holding. In
overturning the California court, the Supreme Court found that the FAA superceded state law
pronouncements and was to be applied to every transaction involving interstate commerce. [401
(11) In Keating, the franchise agreement was between parties residing in multiple jurisdictions, thereby
placing the contract within interstate commerce. [411 Because the California statute directly conflicted
with the federal statute, the Supreme Court held that Federal Law superceded state law and thus, the
California statute was preempted. [421 Thus, the end result of Keating was to establish the supremacy of
the FAA over State law pronouncements governing arbitration. The Supreme Court did not stop with
Keating. In 1985, two cases were decided which put an end to many plaintiffs arguments as to the
enforceability of arbitration clauses.

{12} In another Supreme Court case, Dean Witter Reynolds v. Byrd, [43? the Court held that even where
a multiplicity of proceedings may result from the enforcement of an arbitration clause, the interest in
judicial efficiency is not enough to outweigh the interest in promoting arbitration. [,1 Prior to Byrd, a
plaintiff could argue that the enforcement of an arbitration clause would result in additional proceedings,
thus further delaying the ultimate decision and resulting in additional hardships being placed on the
parties. Such inefficiency seemed to fly in the face of the reason for the FAA's enactment. However, the
Supreme Court did not agree with this observation and found that the interest in promoting arbitration
was more important than mere efficiency. [451 Also in 1985, the Supreme Court began to undermine the
public policy arguments against arbitration. In MitsubishiMotors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
[461 the Court removed the ban on anti-trust actions being decided by arbitration. [471 Due to
Mitsubishi,areas which, on the basis of public policy in the past have been viewed as improper subject
matter for arbitration, are now subject to arbitration. [481 Congress now allows patent questions to be
decided by arbitration. [491 The securities exception has been overruled, [501 and the ERISA exception
has been buried. [51] While there are subject areas which the Supreme Court still feels demands Article
III consideration due to public policy concerns, [52[ the trend toward permitting and enforcing
arbitration clauses has been unmistakable.
1131 Only lately has there been a slight reversal in the Supreme Court's approach to enforcing arbitration
agreements. In Volt Info. Sciences v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Jr.Univ., [531 the Supreme
Court decided that the FAA was not designed to preempt the entire field of arbitration, and as long as

the State law favors arbitration, that State law can be used instead of Federal law. [541 While Volt has
not been widely followed, it does demonstrate the Supreme Court's willingness to step back from the
hard-line stance of enforcing all arbitration agreements pursuant to the FAA. Still, current caselaw
squarely favors the enforcement of arbitration. While Volt holds that States may regulate arbitration, the
States still have to conduct such regulation in such a manner so as not to impede the institution of
arbitration proceedings. [551

IV. LEGAL STANDING OF ARBITRATION - INTERNATIONAL LAW
1141 The most telling evidence demonstrating the enforceability of arbitration agreements exists in the
international treaties and model laws which have been adopted by the majority of the countries in the
world. Only nine nations reported in the ITA Scorecard [561 that they have no form of arbitration treaty
in their legal infrastructure. [571 The vast majority of the countries reported have adopted either the New
York, Panama, or ICSID conventions. [58] One can draw the conclusion from the widespread
acceptance of these conventions that the resolution of international disputes via arbitration is an
important part of foreign policy for most of the world.
(15} However, the issue is still enforceability. How are other countries going to enforce arbitration
agreements? The easiest way to answer this question is to look at the text of the Panama and New York
Conventions. Both of these treaties basically state that where an arbitration agreement is deemed to
exist, any award entered by the arbitrators will be binding. [591 There are some provisions that discuss
the unenforceability of arbitration awards, but most all of those provisions concern the public policy of
the country where the award is being enforced. [60 Basically, where the public policy of a country will
not be infringed, an arbitration award must be enforced under the New York and Panama conventions.
[611 The concept of public policy is where the real question of enforceability becomes prevalent. For
example, Germany maintains that an arbitration agreement must be a separate document, and any
adhesiveness in the bargaining process will void the arbitration agreement on the basis of public policy.
[62] France and England, on the other hand, tend to be more accepting of arbitration agreements which
may be adhesive. [631 Thus, the adhesivness/enforceability answer ultimately depends on the public
policy notions of the jurisdiction in which a party is attempting to compel arbitration.
(16) Germany's legal infrastructure is more protective of its consumers with regard to equality of
bargaining power. Section 1025 of the Zivilprozessordnug (ZPO) regulates arbitrability. [J4 The ZPO
is very restrictive as to what constitutes a binding arbitration agreement. First, the arbitration agreement
must be a document separate from the underlying contract. [651 Second, the agreement must expressly
state the legal relation to which it refers. [661 Both of these requirements, coupled with the normal
requirements for contract validity, gave the German consumer much more notice than an American
consumer. [671 It is much more difficult to bury an arbitration clause in boilerplate contractual language
when the clause must be enumerated in a separate document. Not only does Germany regulate the form
which an arbitration agreement must take, German law also addresses the difficulty of unequal
bargaining power between parties to an arbitration agreement. [68 German law specifically abhors the
use of economic or social superiority to introduce an arbitration agreement into a transaction. [691 If a
party uses such superiority to impose an arbitration agreement, that arbitration agreement will
subsequently be held void. [701 The German courts have generally applied this part of the ZPO to
situations where one of the parties is financially unable to arbitrate, and is thus removed from access to
the court system because they are bound to arbitrate. [711 An individual's economic freedom seems to
play a much more important role in German public policy decisions. Consequently, adhesive contracts
may be looked on more negatively in Germany than in the United States, especially those contracts
which contain arbitration agreements.

V. ADHESION AND PUBLIC POLICY
(17) Since the hypothetical in this paper has a Finnish software company attempting to compel
arbitration in the United States, this paper will focus on the United States' approach to public policy and
adhesiveness. This focus is in part because the New York and Panama Conventions allow "public
policy" to be the only major loophole that may undermine the enforcement of foreign arbitrage awards.
Consequently, it is important to know just what "public policy" is in the jurisdiction where enforcement
is sought. The FAA provides that an arbitration agreement may be held void under such grounds which
exist at law or statute regarding any other type of contract. [721 The Supreme Court has further found
that statutes which treat arbitration clauses differently than other contracts are preempted by the FAA.
[731 Consequently, while an arbitration agreement is generally presumed valid, it may be attacked under
traditional contract avoidance doctrines. Of course, this begs the question: what are the traditional
contract avoidance doctrines? And are these State or Federal doctrines?
(18) Because international transactions generally fall under the Federal commerce power, [741 the initial

answer is that Federal common law controls avoidance. However, when discussing the validity of a
specific contract, State law controls, and the doctrines which allow for avoidance of an arbitration
agreement are those state doctrines which provide for contract avoidance. [751 While a motion to
compel arbitration may be heard in Federal District Court, that court is ultimately going to apply state
common law to determine the validity of an arbitration clause. [761 While specific state laws will vary
depending on the jurisdiction, there is some underlying consistency as to the doctrines that can be used
to invalidate arbitration clauses.
119) In this paper's hypothetical, the purchaser of the Finnish company's software was probably not
aware of the presence of the arbitration clause in the shrink-wrap license. In all probability, the office
manager of the American publisher went to a retail computer store and bought the software off the shelf.
As a result of such a purchasing environment, there is a question as to the awareness of the license terms
by the buyer. Still, if the buyer were aware of the terms of the license, is there any meaningful choice
present to the buyer? These types of questions arise when the courts are asked to address mass-mark:
licenses.
(20) In general, the courts have not taken circumstances into account when determining enforceability
of contract terms. [7] One commentator noted that a signature is virtually conclusive evidence of
consent to the terms of a contract. [781 Th'-re are many instances which demonstrate the use of adhesion
contracts. When one buys a cruse ship tic..;t, [791 a stock purchase agreement with a broker, [801 and
now, Bank of America is including arbitration clauses in its bank account agreements. [811 Each of
these instances gives an example of the use of arbitration where the buyer has no option to remove the
arbitration clause from the contract. However, in all of these circumstances, the arbitration clause will
be found to be enforceable. 82] Generally, only the most compelling evidence of duress or fraud will
cause the arbitration clause to be invalidated. [831 In fact, the courts sometimes end up with a rather
absurd result in their predisposition toward arbitration. In Hodes v. Achille Lauro et Altri-Gestione,L§4]
the federal court found that the provision on the back of a boarding pass required the passengers who
were taken hostage aboard the cruse ship Achille Lauro to bring their claims in Naples, Italy. [851 It is
highly questionable that the passengers even thought to turn their boarding passes over to notice the
contractual terms included. While the Hodes case is an example of the extreme, the basic premise is still
present in federal enforcement of arbitration clauses. [861 Several commentators have questioned this
approach. [871 Is the rigidly formalistic enforcement of arbitration clauses in the public's best interest?
(21) One of the standard arguments against enforcing arbitration agreements which are contained in

adhesion contracts is the lack of equality in bargaining power. [881 The traditional theory of contract has
two equally matched parties, negotiating at arms length for a mutual benefit. [891 Unfortunately, this
ideal does not match the current economic reality. The vast majority of contracts are consumer purchase
agreements for goods or services, and the consumer is at a great disadvantage in bargaining power
relative to the vendor. [901 While the vendor will argue that the customer only need go elsewhere to
avoid the adhesive contract, the truth of the matter is that there is often no other vendor to turn to that
does not use a similarly restrictive contract formulation. [911 This lack of meaningful choice as to the
terms of the agreement is especially apparent within the banking community, and it is rapidly becoming
true in the software industry.
{22) For the most part, arbitration agreements have been considered the same way most other clauses in
a contract have been considered. The only real difference is the federal common law requirement to
resolve doubts as to the scope of the arbitration clause in favor of arbitration. [2]j Consequently, fraud,
duress, coercion, incapacity, unconscionability, and other such defenses have been available to the party
not wishing to submit to arbitration. [931 The most obvious defense to the arbitration agreement in our
hypothetical publishing company's problem is adhesion. The argument being: there was no true consent
to the terms since the terms were never read, and even if they were read, the terms could not have been
modified; also, no signature is required to demonstrate a reading and understanding of the duties and
obligations. [941 Unfortunately for the American publisher, the courts have never recognized a doctrine
of adhesion as a defense to contractual terms. [951 What generally results is the courts discussing the
concept of adhesion in relation to doctrine of unconscionability. [96 Since the heart of the issue
therefore turns on the issue being unconscionability, as opposed to simply adhesion, the entire question
suddenly becomes much more complex.
(23) Unconsionability comes in two forms: procedural unconscionability, and substantive
unconscionability. 127 The first of these two forms relates more to the circumstances surrounding the
entry into the transaction. [981 Generally, procedural unconsionability is a factual issue whereby
contractual terms are buried in the body of a contract under pages of boilerplate language. (991 This is
the type of unconscionability which is most similar to adhesion. The software vendor places a license on
the front of the boxed software, containing the entire license on one page. To do this, the type has to be
small; the more clauses that are included, the smaller the type must be to fit within the allotted space.
The ultimate result of this comprehensive document being compressed into a space smaller than a single
sheet of paper, is that the purchaser of the software does not bother to read the terms of the license
agreement. Included in these license terms is an arbitration agreement. Is this situation unconscionable?
Has the buyer of the software consented to a binding arbitration agreement to which he/she should be
held subject to?
(24) Where the unconsionability is only procedural, it is likely that the clause in question will be held
valid. [1001 The courts have generally required both procedural and substantive unconscionability to
find a contractual term invalid. [1011 Substantive unconscionability, on the other hand is the notion that
the actual agreement itself is grossly unfair or unreasonable. [1021 Where there is substantive
unconscionability the courts have been more suspect of the contractual terms. [1031 If a term is
inherently unfair or oppressive, the term may be declared invalid. This is especially true where
procedural unconscionability is also present and there is not any meaningful choice among similar
products to which the consumer can turn. [1041
125) While arbitration can theoretically be attacked under the same doctrines which exist at law or
equity to attack any contract, the Supreme Court has seemed to answer each question regarding the
validity of an arbitration clause with a strong favoritism toward arbitration. Lack of meaningful choice is

seen as absent from the modem marketplace, inconvenient location of situs has been overlooked as
insufficiently oppressive, and inequality of bargaining power is simply ignored. Not much is left to stand
on to dispute an arbitration unless the facts of the case are so obvious that some form of fraud or duress
can be evidenced.
126) So how does this favoritism for arbitration fit into the framework of international shrink-wrap
licenses? American courts have only had the opportunity to decide one case regarding the enforceability
of terms included in a shrink-wrap license. [1051 However, the Supreme Court has had the opportunity
to address adhesive arbitration clauses in international maritime transactions. [1061 When taken
together, these two cases should prove instructive as to the enforceability of arbitration clauses in
international shrink-wrap software licenses.
(27} The current stance of the Supreme Court regarding adhesive international arbitration agreements
can be found in Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros,S.A. v. MIV Sky Reefer. [1071 The facts of this case are
relatively simple. A purchaser of a fruit shipment sued the charterer of the ship MN Sky Reefer because
the charterer failed to properly stow a shipment of fruit, which shifted during transit, causing over $1
million in damage. [1081 The charterer moved to compel arbitration in Tokyo, Japan, as provided for
according to the back of the bill of lading. [1091 However, the buyer of the fruit had not negotiated the
bill of lading, but had simply been tendered the bill of lading upon purchase of the fruit. [1101 The
District Court granted the motion to compel and, of course, the buyer appealed. [1111 This arbitration
agreement was typical of the classic adhesive situation. Either the fruit buyer took the bill of lading, or
went elsewhere for its fruit. The Supreme Court, in upholding the motion to compel arbitration, gave
some very interesting reasons for the validity of adhesive arbitration agreements.
(28) Prior to the Sky Reefer case, forum selection clauses were held to increase liability of a maritime
carrier. [1121 This increase in liability was considered to be in violation of the Carriage of Goods by Sea
Act (COGSA) [1131 and was consequently held invalid. [1141 This premise had been well entrenched in
American admiralty law for more than twenty years. [1151 However, when applied in conjunction with
the FAA and the New York Convention, the Supreme Court found that the arbitration clause contained
in the bill of lading was enforceable. [1161 The reasons for the upholding of the arbitration clause
seemed to lie mostly with international concerns. The Supreme Court relied heavily on the fact that of
the 66 signatories to the Hague Convention (which is the treaty that COGSA codified in the U.S.), not
or- ad interpreted their domestic codification of the Convention to stop the use of foreign forum
selection clauses. [1171 The Court especially relied on the fact that England had expressly rejected a ban
on foreign forum selection clauses some fifty years earlier. [IM Consequently, the court held that since
the United States is a member of the international community, the United States needs to follow the
traditional custom of the rest of the world in allowing foreign forum selection clauses. [1191 The
presence ofjus commune and the international obligations of the United States arising out of the New
York and Panama conventions seemed to demand that the Supreme Court enforce an adhesive
arbitration agreement. [1201 And yet, neither the New York or the Panama conventions deal with the
validity of an arbitration agreement. The two conventions only discuss what form an arbitration
agreement must take. [1211 The public policy of each individual country is still a factor in determining
validity and may be called on to invalidate an otherwise valid arbitration agreement. [1221 However, in
spite of this local public policy notion, the Supreme Court still found a need to uphold an adhesive
arbitration agreement.
(29) For the most part, adhesive arbitration agreements have been held to be enforceable. However, with
the advent of mass-market licensing, a new issue raises its ugly head. So far we have looked at
arbitration agreements which included some sort of active assent to the terms. Either via signature, or

acceptance of a tendered bill of lading, there has been some sort of action which can be legally
construed as voluntary consent to be bound by the terms of the agreement. In dealing with software
licenses, consent to the terms of the license is not so clear.
{30) As digital property continues to increase in value, attempts to protect digital property have also
increased. One of these attempts has been the mass-market software license. By using a license, a
software vendor can control distribution and modification of the software. Prior to the implementation
of a software license, once a person bought a piece of software, they could decompile the program,
change the program, and then copy and sell the modified program while never having to incur the initial
development costs which the original software developer had to incur. Other difficulties inherent to the
protection of software is due to the fact of the ease to which it can be reproduced. It is a relatively
simple procedure to copy a software program and place the copied program on a number of computers.
Such activity dilutes the market for a particular program, and cuts into the software developer's profits.
Also, under the doctrine of "first sale" a buyer of copyrighted material can turn around and sell the work
to a third party. [1231 Because copyright protection is so limited, software developers began to use
licenses to restrict the activities of the software users to a greater extent than the activities that the
copyright statute permits a user to do. A software license also can include protective clauses which
restrict the user from decompiling the object code (and thus discovering the software developer's trade
secrets), as well as including forum selection/arbitration clauses. There is just one small problem with
software licenses: there is no signature attesting to the purchaser's assent to the terms of the license.
Under a traditional contract framework, this lack of verifiable assent makes the license unilateral, and
somewhat unenforceable. To correct this problem, software vendors have included a term in the license
making the act of opening the cellophane wrapper an act of assent to the terms of the software license.
(311 The courts have only recently addressed this means of contract formation. The ProCDv.
Zeidenberg [1241 decision finally addressed the issue of shrink-wrap licenses directly. The facts of the
case are relatively simple. Defendant Zeidenberg purchased a computer program from plaintiffs which
allowed defendant to download telephone listings stored on plaintiffs CD-ROM (which was a part of
the software package.) Defendant then proceeded to write his own search engine for the data
downloaded from the plaintiffs CD-ROM and post the data on the internet. The data removed from
plaintiffs CD-ROM was not protected by copyright as the data was simply telephone listings,
consequently there was no direct copyright infringement. [1251 The plaintiff sold the software with a
user guide which included a series of terms entitled a "Single User License Agreement." The primary
issue in this case is the enforceability of the license agreement. [1261
{32) Unfortunately, the facts surrounding the placement of the license are not quite the same as the
traditional "shrink-wrap" license as the terms of the ProCDlicense were inside the software box, and
not on the face of the packaging. However, the opinion of the district court actually addresses the
effectiveness of the more common "shrink-wrap" license. The district court found the ProCDlicense
unenforceable, but only because there was no opportunity to inspect or consider the terms of the license.
[1271 Yet, the dicta of the district court seems to point to the enforceability of a license where the terms
of the license are observable before purchase. [1281 If the license terms are plainly apparent on the front
of the box, a buyer can inspect and consider the terms before purchasing the software. [1291 Under this
reasoning, a shrink-wrap license which is attached to the front of the a software program box is an
enforceable license, since the purchaser has the opportunity to inspect and consider the license terms
prior to actual purchase. [1301 Fortunately, the questions raised by the district court were answered upon
appeal. The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's holding and found the license enforceable. [1311
Interestingly enough, the appellate court did not focus on the opportunity to review as a condition
precedent to enforceability. All that was required for the license to be enforceable was that the terms not

be objectionable under general contract principles. [1321 Under the appellate court's analysis, even less
obvious licenses which are inside the box, and not placed on the outside cover of the box are binding. In
fact, the appellate court recognized the difficulty of putting a license on the front of a box and found that
such requirement is not really appropriate. [1331 The banking industry, along with the securities,
architectural, and medical professions, has already made widespread use of the form arbitration clause.
[1341 The query has now become: if the consumer has no other option, is the arbitration clause really
assented to? Or, is the idea of meaningful choice totally lost?
{33) The courts seem to think that the need for meaningful consumer choice regarding arbitration
cL uses is not as important as it is in other types of adhesive contract provisions. [1351 Several courts
and commentators have noted that arbitration is not inherently oppressive. [1361 Because of the ability
of arbitration to 1) reduce the costs of litigation, and 2) to allow the parties determine what is fair, an
arbitration clause seems to be enforceable, even where there is doubt as to the voluntariness of the
consent by one of the parties. [1371 Some commentators even go further and propose arguments in
support of adhesive contract provisions. [1381 The basic principle of this argument is that adhesive
contract clauses, not just arbitration clauses, decrease the transaction costs for any particular contract.
[1391 With decreased transaction costs, both parties benefit; the buyer receives a lower purchase price,
and the vendor has some measure of consistency as to the numerous transactions they enter into daily.
The concept at work is denominated as "fairness." [140] It is important not to equate "fairness" with
"equality", however, because the "fairness" concept is a better representation of the actual marketplace
and its inherent variance in bargaining power. [1411 The market envisioned under this fairness "model"
however, does have one underlying supposition which may not be entirely accurate given marketplace
realities. The assumption that the consumer is not required to enter into any particular contract, and that
they have the freedom to chose different vendors, who all use different commercial practices, may be
m ..eading. [1421 In situations where the consumer has no meaningful choice as to different vendors of
a particular object and the object of the transaction is what is generally known as a "necessity," [1431 the
issue of adhesion would be appropriately equated to unconscionability. [1441 However, such use of
adhesion as a proxy of unconscionability should be used sparingly, since most consumers are not
dealing with "necessities" when it comes to the purchase of software products, and in fact, do have a
wide range of vendors among which to patronize.
f341 Meaningful choice, however, is only one way unconscionability can be asserted. It can also be
argued that the forum which is required under the arbitration agreement is an unconscionable term.
While the Supreme Court rejected the Montana Supreme Court's decision in Doctor'sAssociates v.
Casarotto,[1451 the reasoning of the Montana Court is instructive regarding the concept of what is
unconscionable. [1461 One of the factors in the Montana court's consideration of the facts of Casarotto,
was that the franchise agreement required the respondents, who were Montana residents, to arbitrate in
Connecticut. [1471 So, while the Montana Court was overruled, the reasoning for the overruling was the
fact that the FAA preempted the Montana law regulating the form of an arbitration agreement. [1481
The reasoning regarding the location of the arbitration's situs was not addressed. However, under the Sky
Reefer case, location of situs may not be an issue. [1491 Much of the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions
take the position that location is not a sufficient reason to hold an arbitration clause unconscionable.
[1501 Still, each determination should be based on the facts of the specific case, and there may be
instances where the choice of situs will be considered unconscionable. With the resolution to disallow
seriously (grossly) inconvenient locations under a claim of unconscionability, there is little left upon
which to base an attack against an adhesive arbitration agreement.

IV. CONCLUSION

(35) The seeming effect of most of American caselaw is the arbitration clause included in a
mass-market shrink-wrap type license is enforceable. The Sky Reefer case notes that international
transactions involving goods will be effected by the FAA and the component treaty (depending on
which country the parties belong to.) Because of the strong support arbitration has in the caselaw
interpreting the FAA, if the arbitration agreement is not unconscionable, or was not entered into via
duress, fraud, or other form of coercion, the arbitration agreement is valid. Also, because of the current
trend equating the opening of a box as evidence of assent to a license agreement contained within that
box, it seems that the terms of the license, including any arbitration clause, is agreed to when the
customer breaks the cellophane wrapper of the software's packaging. Assenting to the license agreement
also signifies assent to its component arbitration agreement clause. Consequently, the arbitration
agreement is binding under American law. While this may not be the state of the law in Germany,
adhesive arbitration agreements are not seen as inherently oppressive, because they still offer a remedy
for the injured party. The inequality of bargaining power argument has not had much success in
American courts. As such, the doctrine of adhesion, to be successful in attacking an arbitration
agreement, must have something more. This something more will almost always have to be substantive
unconscionability, unless there was fraud or duress in the formation of the arbitration agreement. It is
not an easy task to find grounds to have an arbitration agreement declared invalid in the United States.
Most of the arguments against enforcement have been removed, and all that is left seems to hinge upon
the facts of each specific case. Unfortunately, because of the rapidly changing topography of the digital
market place, results which were reasonable ten years ago can now cause potentially disastrous results to
smaller companies dealing with digital property. Thus, the Federal courts should rethink their hard-line
stance as to the enforcement of "shrink-wrap" arbitration clauses.
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